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INTRODUCTION
RUSSELL L. WEAVER*
DAVID F. PARTLETT**
More than four decades have elapsed since the U.S. Supreme
Court’s landmark decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan1 and
time has given way to deeper reflection. Sullivan was initially met
with high praise.  Alexander Meiklejohn claimed that the decision
was “an occasion for dancing in the streets”2 and columnist
Anthony Lewis characterized Sullivan as a “thrilling” decision.3  At
the time, these reactions were altogether to be expected. Sullivan
involved the free speech rights of activists in the civil rights move-
ment and the Alabama defamation law challenged in Sullivan had
little salience in the vortex of that struggle.4  In addition, the idea
of robust free speech as exercised in New England town meetings
had strong democratic appeal to Americans.  All of these forces,
however, were fiercely domestic, so it is little surprise that as the
same issues arose in other nations they were addressed in different
ways.  While Sullivan has helped nudge British Commonwealth
countries to reassess their approaches to free speech and defama-
tion, most Commonwealth countries have rejected the Sullivan doc-
trine and fashioned their own approaches to speech and
defamation.  Nevertheless, as free speech entered the human rights
canon throughout the Western World, Sullivan — a decision of the
most powerful court in the most powerful nation committed to the
rule of law — remains a reference point.
* Professor of Law and Distinguished University Scholar, University of Louis-
ville, Louis D. Brandeis School of Law.
** Vice President, Dean, and Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University
School of Law.
1. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
2. Harry J. Kalvern Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on “The Central Meaning
of the First Amendment,” 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 191, 221 n.125 (quoting Alexander
Meiklejohn).
3. Anthony Lewis, New York Times v. Sullivan Reconsidered: Time to Return to “The
Central Meaning of the First Amendment,” 83 COLUM. L. REV. 603, 625 (1983).
4. See 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
1
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This symposium issue of the New York Law School Law Review
brings together a small group of prominent defamation law practi-
tioners and scholars from three continents — Europe, Australia,
and the United States — to explore developments in defamation,
free speech, and privacy law both inside and outside of the United
States.5  Forty years ago, the communications revolution manifested
itself in national media reporting; today, the velocity of informa-
tion, the breakdown in international borders, and the revolutionary
potential of the Internet add new dimensions to old problems.  A
number of articles focus on post-Sullivan developments in other
countries.  Others point out that changes in technology have fur-
ther complicated this area of the law.  All reveal how freedom of
speech in each society is rooted in history and subject to evolving
legal and social norms.
Two papers examine Canadian defamation law developments.
Professor Adrienne Stone in Defamation of Public Figures: North Ameri-
can Contrasts reviews Canada’s approach to free expression with par-
ticular emphasis on Hill v. Church of Scientology.6  She notes that Hill
rejected the Sullivan decision in its entirety, emphasizing the indi-
vidual interest in reputation and the importance of truthfulness in
public discourse.7  After analyzing how Canada balances free
speech and reputation issues — with greater protection for reputa-
tion and lesser protection for speech — she concludes with a chal-
lenge to Canadian free speech proponents to “consider more
closely, and to justify, the attitude to state power revealed in its case
law.”8  Professor Euge´nie Brouillet in Free Speech, Reputation, and the
Canadian Balance also focuses on the Canadian approach to reputa-
tion and speech and agrees that Canada has struck a different bal-
ance than the United States.9  However, although she notes that
5. This issue grew out of a Defamation Discussion Forum that was co-sponsored
by New York Law School, Washington & Lee University School of Law, and the Univer-
sity of Louisville’s Louis D. Brandeis School of Law and held at New York Law School in
New York City on December 3-4, 2004.  The articles published here were presented at
that event.
6. Adrienne Stone, Defamation of Public Figures: North American Contrasts, 50 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 9 (2005-2006) (discussing Hill, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130).
7. Id. at 16-17, 19.
8. Id. at 32.
9. Euge´nie Brouillet, Free Speech, Reputation, and the Canadian Balance, 50 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 33 (2005-2006).
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“[o]ne cannot say that there is only one right balance that must be
reached in matters of defamation,” she concludes that “[b]ecause
of the fundamental importance of free speech and free press in
democratic societies . . . free speech must be favored at least when
political speech is at stake.”10
In our article Defamation, Free Speech, and Democratic Governance,
we discuss how Australia and England rejected Sullivan in favor of a
speech-enhancing doctrine based on extensions of common law
qualified privilege.11  Australia chose to protect material pertaining
to governmental and political matters affecting the representa-
tional governmental structure of Australia, provided that the pub-
lisher acted reasonably,12 and England, having precluded
governmental bodies from proceeding in defamation claims, chose
to protect reporting on “matters of public concern.”13  The article
examines how the Australian and English extensions of common
law qualified privilege affect media reporting and contrasts their
impact with that of the Sullivan decision.14  The article includes ex-
tensive empirical evidence involving interviews with reporters, pro-
ducers, editors, and defamation lawyers, and concludes that these
three standards have very different effects on the media, but that
the differences are rooted in cultural and legal differences.15
In Origins of the Public Figure Doctrine in First Amendment Defama-
tion Law, Professor Catherine Hancock focuses on a different aspect
of the Sullivan precedent: its extension to public figures.16  She fo-
cuses on the Court’s development of the so-called “public figure
doctrine” and analyzes the implications of that development for the
Court’s creation of First Amendment doctrine.17  She concludes
with the observation that “[g]iven the richness and elusiveness of
the public figure concept, it seems destined to vacillate in its mean-
ing, as a permanent moving target, as long as it retains the role of
10. Id. at 55.
11. Russell L. Weaver & David F. Partlett, Defamation, Free Speech, and Democratic
Governance, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 57, 69 (2005-2006).
12. Lange v. Australian Broad. Corp. (1997) 189 C.L.R. 520, 521.
13. Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd., [2001] 2 A.C. 127, 204 (H.L.).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Catherine Hancock, Origins of the Public Figure Doctrine in First Amendment Defa-
mation Law, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 81 (2005-2006).
17. Id.
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expressing hotly contested compromises over the clash of free
speech interests and the ancient interest in reputation protected by
libel law.”18
Professor David Goldberg argues for a more international ap-
proach to the problem of defamation.  In his article, Transnational
Communication and Defamatory Speech: A Case for Establishing Norms for
the Twenty-First Century, he analyzes the International Convention
Concerning the Use of Broadcasting in the Cause of Peace as ap-
plied to defamatory speech.19  He notes that Resolution 26 of the
1948 Conference on Freedom of Information called for the “ap-
pointment of a committee of jurists to study the laws of libel, and to
formulate a body of fundamental rules and principles on this sub-
ject, so closely connected with certain types of international propa-
ganda, but in the opinion of delegates, not ready for consideration
without further research.”20  Professor Goldberg suggests that such
a study “remains unfinished business for the international legal
community.”21
Professor Clive Walker in Reforming the Crime of Libel focuses on
criminal libel rather than civil libel.22  Professor Walker notes that
criminal libel has a “long and troubled history” as an “instrument of
state repression.”23  His paper traces that history and discusses ef-
forts at criminal libel reform in England and Wales.24  He con-
cludes by observing that in our modern society “there is no
convincing rationale” for criminal libel and advocates for its aban-
donment, arguing that its use “involves a most serious threat to
rights to free expression” and that “there are adequate, albeit im-
perfect, alternative legal actions which provide redress for attacks
on personal reputation.”25
18. Id. at 143.
19. David Goldberg, Transnational Communication and Defamatory Speech: A Case for
Establishing Norms for the Twenty-First Century, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 145 (2005-2006).
20. Id. at 166-67.
21. Id. at 167.
22. Clive Walker, Reforming the Crime of Libel, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 169 (2005-
2006).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 176-84.
25. Id. at 201, 203.
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In Privacy, Princesses, and Paparazzi, Professor Barbara McDon-
ald shifts the focus of the symposium from defamation to privacy.26
She analyzes two important European privacy cases — the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights decision in the Princess Caroline
case,27 and the British House of Lords decision in the Naomi Camp-
bell case28 — and discusses their implications for privacy law.  Pro-
fessor McDonald suggests areas of convergence between the two
decisions and ultimately speculates on their long-term impact on
British and European law.29  She expresses doubt that damage
awards will have much impact on media conduct, especially given
the “relatively modest remedy awarded” in the Campbell case, but
suggests that the willingness of courts to grant injunctive relief may
have much greater impact.30  By contrast, the Van Hannover case
involving Princess Caroline, she argues, should force national
courts in Europe to determine whether their laws are consistent
with the European balance between the protection of privacy and
the freedom of the press.31
Jonathan Donnellan and Justin Peacock in Truth and Conse-
quences: First Amendment Protection for Accurate Reporting on Government
Investigations look closely at the republication doctrine and argue
that existing protections for the news media fail to adequately pro-
tect reporting on government misconduct when those reports are
republications of accusations made by government officials.32  They
propose “[a] recognition of a First Amendment-based limit on the
republication doctrine when the press is providing accurate reports
on government accusations and investigations.”33
Forty years ago, the papers collected here would have been of
some comparative interest.  Today, however, they are of greater im-
portance as we see that ideas about reputation, privacy, and free
26. Barbara McDonald, Privacy, Princesses, and Paparazzi, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 205
(2005-2006).
27. Van Hannover v. Germany [2004] 2 All ER 995.
28. Campbell v. MGN Ltd., Judgment 24 June 2004, in application 59320/00
29. McDonald, supra note 26, at 234-36.
30. Id. at 235.
31. Id. at 235-36.
32. Jonathan Donnellan & Justin Peacock, Truth and Consequences: First Amendment
Protection for Accurate Reporting on Government Investigations, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 237
(2005-2006).
33. Id. at 268.
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speech are fluid and subject to much practical contention.  Mobility
of information, the globalization of commerce, and the access to
the information marketplace stemming from the Internet make
pertinent these ideas.  For example, several years ago, the Austra-
lian High Court in Dow Jones & Co. v. Gutnick, was faced with a
claim made by an Australian resident, Gutnick, against Dow Jones,
about defamation stemming from a small number of downloads of
an electronic story that had been made in the State of Victoria.34
Dow Jones defended, arguing that Sullivan should apply since the
story about Gutnick was placed on its computers in New Jersey.35
The Australian Court applied the prevailing rule that each
download in Victoria constituted publication and concluded that
Australian law was applicable.36  In another example, the English
House of Lords in Berezovsky v. Michaels accepted that English courts
had jurisdiction and applied English law for a Barron’s article on the
Russian politician and businessman Boris Berezovsky.37  In 2002,
the English Law Commission in Defamation and the Internet: A Prelimi-
nary Investigation noted these issues and saw that a solution would
require a “greater harmonisation of the substantive law of
defamation.”38
The most recent salvo in the Internet defamation war was fired
by the English Court of Court of Appeal in Lewis v. King.39  The
court had before it an Internet defamation dispute regarding sev-
eral postings made to boxing websites concerning the actions of
Don King, a promoter who has managed many boxing champi-
ons.40  In particular, one posting accused King of anti-Semitic com-
ments, which King claimed defamed his reputation among the
Jewish community in England.41  The alleged defamatory state-
ments central to the case came from a piece written in the United
34. Dow Jones & Co. v. Gutnick (2002) 210 C.L.R. 575.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. [2000] 1 W.L.R. 1004 (H.L.).
38. LAW COMMISSION, DEFAMATION AND THE INTERNET: A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGA-
TION at 39 (2002), available at http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/docs/defamation2.pdf. See
also Shawn A. Bone, Private Harms in the Cyber-World: The Conundrum of Choice of Law for
Defamation Posed by Gutnick v. Dow Jones & Co., 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 279 (2005).
39. [2004] EWCA (Civ.) 1329.
40. Id.
41. Id.
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States by the New York attorney representing the defendants and
posted on the Internet, and also from an interview given by that
same attorney to a website based in California where the attorney
had posted the complaint in the dispute days before.42  The Court
of Appeal ruled that King could sue in England for his harm suf-
fered there.43  Even though all of the factual events leading up to
the English action occurred in the United States, and even though
the applicable United States law would likely have doomed a cause
of action under the public figure doctrine in Sullivan, the English
Court of Appeal was untroubled by the lower court’s refusal to dis-
miss King’s case.44  The English Court, refusing to accept the “sin-
gle publication rule,” found that the case could proceed on the
basis of King’s reputational harm in England.45
The American press is disgruntled with these decisions, identi-
fying what they see as a crimping of free speech for publishers who
reach beyond the United States.  This attitude is on display in litiga-
tion brought in England by Saudi businessman sheik Khalid Salim a
bin Mahfouz who had brought an action against Rachel Ehrenfeld,
the author of Funding Evil:  How Terrorism is Financed — and How to
Stop It.46  bin Mahfouz and his sons received significant damages for
the defamatory statements about bin Mahfouz’s terrorist connec-
tions.47  Instead of awaiting an enforcement of the judgment,
Ehrenfeld has brought suit in federal court asserting that the suit
and its enforcement violates her First Amendment rights.48
As organizers of the Defamation Discussion Forum, we hope
that the battle of words about various versions of free speech can be
transcended by a sober discussion of the nature of free speech and
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Mahfouz v. Ehrenfeld, [2005] EWHC 1156.
47. Id.
48. Ehrenfeld v. Mahfouz, 2005 WL 696769 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2005) (granting a
motion to effect service of process). See also Sara Ivry, Seeking U.S. Turf for a Free-Speech
Flight, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2005, at C8; Dominic Kennedy, Libel and Money — Why British
Courts are Choice of the World, TIMES (UK), May 19, 2005, at 6; Dominic Kennedy, Judge
Attacks Author Over Libel Tourism Allegation, TIMES (UK), June 16, 2005, at 24; Alyssa A.
Lappen, Libel Wars, FRONTPAGE MAG., July 18, 2005; Jeffrey Toobin, Let’s Go: Libel, THE
NEW YORKER, Aug. 8, 2005, at 36.
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defamation and privacy litigation.49 Sullivan is not holy script distil-
ling all wisdom from the past and into the future.  We expect that
the values at play will evolve and that international scholars should
create a venue for dialogue to mediate the discussion in a time of
the expansion of global information.
49. This is a purpose of our forthcoming book. See RUSSELL L. WEAVER, ANDREW
KENYON, DAVID PARTLETT & CLIVE WALKER, THE RIGHT TO SPEAK ILL: DEFAMATION, REPU-
TATION AND FREE SPEECH (2006).
